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HOW TO SAFELY MAKE INTEROPERABLE HEALTH
INFORMATION EXCHANGE A REALITY
Julia Adler-Milstein*
I. THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY USE AT THE POINT-OF-CARE
Health information technology to support frontline clinical care car-
ries enormous potential for benefit but also risks if used improperly
(most often, unintentionally). Particularly in the patient safety do-
main, there is little disagreement that shifting from a largely paper-
based approach to documenting care, to an electronic record keeping
system in which clinical decisions can be supported by smart tools,
would produce safer care and better outcomes.1 There is evidence to
support important safety gains from health IT—particularly from
clinical decision-support systems to avoid adverse drug events2—but
there is also evidence that reveals the new types of patient safety risks
introduced by health IT.3 While the causes of such unintended conse-
quences are varied, two primary causes are: (1) an under-appreciation
of the complexity of integrating health IT tools into care delivery and
(2) an environment in which policies, incentives, and regulations pro-
duce stakeholder interests that are not always aligned behind the goal
of translating health IT tools into safer care.
II. INTEROPERABLE ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION
EXCHANGE AND EXPECTED BENEFITS
Interoperable electronic health information exchange (HIE) is a
critical domain in which there are significant potential benefits along-
* Associate Professor, Department of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco. This
Article is based on collaborative work with Carol Parker, Michelle Mello, Lucia Savage, & Mar-
tin Gaynor.
1. JANET M. CORRIGAN ET AL., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4, 15–16 (2001).
2. Michael F. Furukawa et al., Meaningful Use of Health Information Technology and De-
clines in In-Hospital Adverse Drug Events, 24 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 729, 729–33, 735
(2017); Rainu Kaushal et al., Effects of Computerized Physician Order Entry and Clinical Deci-
sion Support Systems on Medication Safety: A Systematic Review, 163 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1409, 1409–10, 1413–14 (2003).
3. James M. Walker et al., EHR Safety: The Way Forward to Safe and Effective Systems, 15 J.
AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 272, 272–74 (2008).
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side potential associated harms from making care less safe (i.e., an
unintended consequence) or preventing care from getting safer (i.e.,
lack of intended benefits realization). As an IT-enabled solution, HIE
seeks to ensure that health information can follow patients across care
delivery settings, such that their providers have complete informa-
tion.4 Missing patient information occurs frequently and manual
processes of information exchange introduce patient safety risks (e.g.,
handwriting errors).5 Therefore, widespread electronic health record
(EHR) adoption coupled with HIE is expected to improve patient
outcomes and is currently a top policy priority.6
More specifically, the benefits of HIE are many because, in concept,
HIE should enable access to complete patient information at the
point-of-care.7 This should avoid care that is duplicative and poten-
tially unsafe. The empirical evidence to-date suggests reductions in re-
dundant care as a result of HIE, primarily reductions in laboratory
and imaging tests.8 Reducing unnecessary imaging, and the associated
exposures known to harm patients, is therefore the domain with the
best evidence for how HIE is likely to improve patient safety. How-
ever, more complete information enabled by HIE should result in a
range of other patient safety benefits, such as more accurate diagnoses
and a reduction in potentially harmful drug-drug interactions, drug-
allergy interactions, and drug-lab interactions.9 While these gains are
important, rapid expansion of HIE across disparate EHRs also holds
the potential to introduce new types of patient safety errors that are
not well understood. This will likely require legal and regulatory ap-
proaches to help drive patient safety gains from HIE as well as avoid
unintended patient safety risks.
4. Claudia Williams et al., From the Office of the National Coordinator: The Strategy for Ad-
vancing the Exchange of Health Information, 31 HEALTH AFF. 527, 533 (2012).
5. Peter C. Smith et al., Missing Clinical Information During Primary Care Visits, 293 JAMA
565, 568, 571 (2005).
6. Don Rucker, Achieving the Interoperability Promise of 21st Century Cures, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (June 19, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180618.138568/full/.
7. Thomas Bodenheimer, Coordinating Care—A Perilous Journey Through the Health Care
System, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1064, 1070 (2008).
8. See generally Robert S. Rudin et al., Usage and Effect of Health Information Exchange: A
Systematic Review, 161 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 803 (2014).
9. Chaim M. Bell et al., Association of Communication Between Hospital-Based Physicians
and Primary Care Providers with Patient Outcomes, 24 J. GEN. MED. 381, 382 (2009).
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III. EFFORTS TO ADVANCE INTEROPERABLE HEALTH
INFORMATION EXCHANGE
There has been substantial funding and activity at federal, state, and
local levels to promote HIE in the United States.10 However, the
United States has not followed a single national approach to HIE. In-
stead, different approaches to HIE have emerged in healthcare mar-
kets based on community preferences for how to structure HIE in
terms of the types of organizations involved (e.g., hospitals, ambula-
tory practices, and labs), the types of information that can be accessed
(e.g., test results), and the form of electronic access (e.g., push and
pull). Nonetheless, a common set of terms and definitions to describe
key differences between market-driven approaches to HIE have
emerged based on the types of “lead” organizations: Community HIE
Networks, Enterprise HIE Networks, and EHR Vendor HIE
Networks.11
Community HIE Networks—also referred to as Health Information
Organizations (HIOs) or Regional Health Information Organizations
(RHIOs)—exist when provider organizations in a given community
collaborate to build the technical infrastructure and negotiate the gov-
ernance approach to engage in HIE to improve patient care.12 Typi-
cally, the only restriction on the types of stakeholders that can
participate is geography. A recent survey found 119 of these networks
in the U.S., and these networks are operating in 67% of healthcare
delivery markets.13 Hospitals and ambulatory providers were the most
common types of participants in these networks, typically sharing test
results and summary of care records across their EHR systems.14
Enterprise HIE Networks exist when one or more provider organi-
zations electronically share clinical information to support patient
care with some restriction, beyond geography, that dictates which or-
ganizations are involved. In contrast to Community HIE Networks,
10. See, e.g., Williams et al., supra note 4, at 527 (discussing federal funding); Nat’l Opinion
Research Center, Evaluation of the State HIE Cooperative Agreement Program, HEALTHIT.GOV
(Mar. 2016), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/reports/finalsummativereportmarch_
2016.pdf (discussing state funding); Joshua R. Vest & Bita A. Kash, Differing Strategies to Meet
Information-Sharing Needs: Publicly Supported Community Health Information Exchanges Ver-
sus Health Systems’ Enterprise Health Information Exchanges, 94 MILBANK Q. 77, 79 (2016) (dis-
cussing local funding).
11. Jordan Everson, The Implications and Impact of 3 Approaches to Health Information Ex-
change: Community, Enterprise, and Vendor-Mediated Health Information Exchange, 1 LEARN-
ING HEALTH SYS. 1, 1–3 (2017).
12. Id. at 1–2.
13. Julia Adler-Milstein, Operational Health Information Exchanges Show Substantial
Growth, but Long-Term Funding Remains a Concern, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1486, 1488–89 (2013).
14. Id. at 1488.
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participation restrictions are driven by strategic, proprietary inter-
ests.15 Although broad-based information access across settings would
be in the best interest of the patient, provider organizations are sensi-
tive to the competitive implications of sharing data and may pursue
HIE in a strategic way.16 A common scenario arises when hospitals
choose to affiliate with select ambulatory providers, and invest in HIE
capabilities with them, in order to encourage referrals from these
providers to the hospital rather than to one of the competing
hospitals.17
EHR Vendor HIE Networks exist when HIE occurs within a com-
munity of provider organizations that use an EHR from the same ven-
dor. A subset of EHR vendors has made this capability available;
Epic’s CareEverywhere solution is the best-known example.18 Provid-
ers with an Epic EHR are able to query for and retrieve key clinical
data from any provider organization with Epic EHR that has acti-
vated this functionality. Little is known about the number of existing
enterprise and EHR vendor HIE networks, the number of providers
who use them, or the specific types of clinical information that are
shared.19 A small number of multi-vendor networks (e.g., Com-
monWell) have also emerged, in which a set of EHR vendors have
developed the infrastructure and governance to allow data to be
shared across the providers who choose to participate.
Increasingly, there are efforts to connect these varied networks to
each other, such that a provider organization would only need to con-
nect to one network in order to access all other networks. The final
regulations for the so-called Trusted Exchange Framework and Com-
mon Agreement are expected from the United States Department of
Health and Human Services Office of the National Coordinator
(ONC) for Health IT in late 2018.20 While participation will be volun-
15. Joshua R. Vest, More Than Just a Question of Technology: Factors Related to Hospitals’
Adoption and Implementation of Health Information Exchange, 79 INT’L J. MED. INFORMATICS
797, 797–806 (2010).
16. See generally Joy M. Grossman et al., Creating Sustainable Local Health Information Ex-
changes: Can Barriers to Stakeholder Participation be Overcome?, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH
SYS. CHANGE, Feb. 2008, https://www.nihcm.org/pdf/Research_Brief_No._2_FINAL.pdf.
17. Joy M. Grossman & Genna Cohen, Despite Regulatory Changes, Hospitals Cautious in
Helping Physicians Purchase Electronic Medical Records, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS.
CHANGE, Sep. 2008, at 2–3, https://www.issuelab.org/resources/8986/8986.pdf.
18. T.J. Winden et al., Care Everywhere, a Point-to-Point HIE Tool, 5 APPLIED CLINICAL
INFORMATICS 388, 389–90, 393–94 (2014).
19. Everson, supra note 11, at 5.
20. Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Trusted Exchange Framework and
Common Agreement, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/topic/interoperability/trusted-ex
change-framework-and-common-agreement (last updated Feb. 28, 2018).
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tary, to the extent that the approach is embraced by the market, it
would vastly reduce the fragmentation of the varied networks that
currently exist. Reducing fragmentation would increase the likelihood
that a patient’s data can be accessed regardless of where they receive
care.
IV. PATIENT SAFETY RISKS FROM HIE
While there are important differences between the approaches to
HIE, regardless of approach, a set of corresponding human-mediated
processes must be developed and consistently applied in order to
translate HIE capabilities into safer and more effective care. When
undertaking these processes, weaknesses in provider organizations’ in-
ternal processes and standards are often exposed, which creates op-
portunities for errors and unsafe care. Two common types of errors,
with implications for patient safety, can result when provider organi-
zations pursue one or more approaches to HIE. The first type of error
is related to patient identification and matching. The second type of
error is related to efforts to protect patient privacy.
V. RISK 1: ERRORS RELATED TO PATIENT IDENTIFICATION AND
MATCHING
Because the United States lacks a common individual identifier that
can be used to match patient identity across provider organizations,21
a key challenge facing any HIE effort is how to enable such identifica-
tion and matching. This issue is particularly salient because of the po-
tential patient safety implications that could emerge from incorrect
identification and matching. Provider organizations typically have de-
veloped a set of policies and procedures that dictate patient identifica-
tion and matching, such as how hospitals name newborn babies and
unconscious, unidentified patients. When a provider organization
chooses to share patient information electronically with other pro-
vider organizations, the naming principles are incorporated into the
interface development between the two organizations’ clinical infor-
mation systems. Interfaces allow information to be delivered electron-
ically and securely between separate clinical information systems, such
as EHRs and laboratory information systems, which may not be using
21. OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., HHSP233201300029C,
PATIENT IDENTIFICATION AND MATCHING FINAL REPORT 2–4 (Feb. 7, 2014), http://
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/patient_identification_matching_final_report.pdf; see gener-
ally Michael D. Greenberg & M. Susan Ridgely, Patient Identifiers and the National Health Infor-
mation Network: Debunking a False Front in the Privacy Wars, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L.
31 (2008).
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the same vendor. Even if the two systems are from the same vendor,
the organizations that wish to engage in HIE may not be using the
same or compatible versions of the software. Patient matching and
identification are critical to the development of an interface as they
determine how information is sent and received electronically.
Patient identification and matching are particularly challenging in
the case of the HIO approach to HIE because HIOs typically facilitate
exchange across many provider organizations with many different
vendor products and naming principles. Further, there is no standard
set of attributes used for patient matching across organizations and
not all attributes that an HIO may select for patient matching are col-
lected in all EHRs.22 Even patient medical record numbers do not
offer a robust solution because, within a given provider organization,
patients often have more than one number. This is due to the multiple
patient and information management systems in use that are not in-
terfaced with each other.
The role of the HIO (or other HIE approach) is to accommodate
the multiple naming conventions used across provider organizations
by managing the patient identity and matching process for incoming
electronic clinical information. By maintaining a master patient index,
the HIO can uniquely identify each patient so that clinical information
can be shared across provider organizations. The HIO can accomplish
this in a manner that supports successful patient identification and
matching at each receiving provider organization. However, when pa-
tient identity and matching policies are not applied consistently at the
provider organization, the logic built in to the interface with the HIO
fails to work and the HIO may incorporate a temporary name as a
real patient in their master patient index. For example, a given hospi-
tal’s naming convention may be to use a gender identifier (i.e., female
and male) as the first name and a rotating list of colors as the last
name. If an unconscious male patient arrives at the hospital, and he is
incorrectly entered into a hospital’s EHR as “Man Brown” instead of
“Male Brown,” the interface would fail to identify “Man Brown” as a
temporary name and a new person would be added to the HIO’s
master patient index as “Man Brown” when the hospital shares the
clinical documents associated with this admission with the HIO.
Clinical information associated with “Man Brown” could then be elec-
tronically sent to other provider organizations identified as one of the
patient’s providers, further propagating this failure in the patient iden-
tification and matching process and potentially creating false patients
22. PATIENT IDENTIFICATION AND MATCHING FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 12–13, 18, 27.
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in multiple electronic record systems. Many provider organizations re-
quire active consent by their clinical or administrative staff to create
new patient records when receiving electronic health information
from an outside organization through an interface because of this is-
sue. As a result, clinical information necessary for patients to receive
safe and effective care may be incorrectly attributed to a false name or
rejected by the receiving electronic record system because of interven-
tion by clinical or administrative staff.
In addition, if another unconscious male patient is admitted at a
later date and the same failure to follow the naming convention occurs
at the same point in the color rotation, the records for the most recent
patient could be combined with the records of the previous “Man
Brown” patient. Once an incorrect match is made and records are
merged, it is difficult to go back and appropriately assign each piece of
clinical information to the correct patient. Rather than risk propagat-
ing incorrect information, the HIO will likely make all the information
inaccessible to provider organizations, either by tagging the clinical
documents so they are not viewable or by completely deleting them.
Thus, robust patient identification processes heavily depend on the
actions of staff within provider organizations. Since these positions
often have relatively high turnover rates, this creates a challenge for
provider organizations to consistently apply carefully crafted policies
and procedures.23 Data quality issues that commonly exist within pro-
vider organizations include: spelling errors; incomplete patient identi-
fiers; transposition of numbers and letters; and inconsistencies in
conventions (such as how to handle hyphenated last names). In the
case of HIE when this identifying information is shared, data quality
issues propagate through the HIO’s provider network and increasing
the risk of failed or misidentification, both of which pose a risk to
patient safety.
Patient matching—the process of ensuring recently created or re-
ceived health information is added to the correctly identified patient’s
record—requires constant management within a provider organiza-
tion and HIO. There is a fine balance between how patient matches
are managed. If too stringent, the result is patients having multiple
records and providers potentially missing critical information because
they fail to find each of the records. If too flexible, patient records
may get inappropriately combined resulting in inaccurate clinical in-
formation contained in the patient record.
23. Id. at 9.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-2\DPL204.txt unknown Seq: 8 27-MAR-19 12:11
204 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:197
VI. LEGAL & POLICY APPROACHES TO REDUCE ERRORS
RELATED TO PATIENT IDENTIFICATION & MATCHING
To ensure effective patient identification and matching, multiple
and broad infrastructure changes are critical. The ONC commissioned
a project to evaluate current efforts to improve patient identification
and matching as well as to provide recommendations for future ef-
forts. The draft recommendations were reviewed by more than 150
organizations including health systems, HIE organizations, EHR ven-
dors, and vendors of HIE solutions.24 The final report, released in
February 2014, provides recommendations that require action at mul-
tiple levels: from federal policy to EHR vendors, HIE organizations,
and health care providers. The recommendations include infrastruc-
ture improvements, such as standardizing patient identifying attrib-
utes and including these attributes when information is electronically
exchanged between provider institutions. Increasing and standardizing
patient identification attributes would first require enhancements to
EHRs. Therefore, the report recommends expanding the list of feder-
ally-certified attributes currently required in EHRs including a previ-
ous last name, middle name, as well as home, business, and cell phone
numbers.25 These newly-required elements would facilitate efforts to
improve matching efficiency and accuracy, but are not commonly pre-
sent.26 There is ongoing work to implement this as well as to improve
the accuracy of patient matching algorithms applied to the attribute
data.
VII. RISK 2: ERRORS RELATED TO PATIENT PRIVACY PROTECTION
HIOs and other HIE approaches prioritize patient privacy protec-
tions to comply with state and federal law as well as to meet the ex-
pectations of provider organizations that have entrusted HIOs with
the protected health information of their patients. Both provider orga-
nizations and patients must feel confident that there is an approach in
place that will safeguard patient privacy. If provider organizations
doubt the HIO’s ability to protect patients’ privacy, they will not share
clinical information through the HIO. If patients doubt the HIO’s
ability to protect their privacy, they will actively prohibit their infor-
mation from being shared with the HIO. As a result, HIOs invest in:
(1) specific and detailed Data Use Agreements (DUAs) with their
provider organization participants; (2) policies and procedures for the
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id.
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maintenance and use of protected health information; and (3) privacy
and security officers to monitor usage, conduct audits of access, and
guide response to privacy and security inquiries by patients and pro-
vider institutions.27
Patient privacy is regulated by state and by federal law. States may
have privacy laws that are more stringent than federal laws, particu-
larly with regard to mental health. The Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) provides a foundation for
privacy and security protections of health information in the United
States. HIPAA regulates the electronic sharing of protected health in-
formation.28 Protected health information includes clinical informa-
tion that would identify a person and relay information about
treatment for a medical condition or payment for health care
services.29
Patient consent procedures determine whether patient information
is accessible to providers participating in an HIO. As background,
HIPAA requires patient consent when a provider queries for or re-
quests information about a patient that resulted from care that the
patient received from another provider (i.e., if a provider orders a di-
agnostic test, the ordering provider is not required to seek patient
consent in order to receive the results of the diagnostic test. The pa-
tient’s consent is assumed, given that she complied with the provider’s
order to have the test.). For example, a patient arrives indicating she
was at an urgent care center or emergency department two nights ago
and was told to follow-up with her primary care provider. In order to
provide effective follow-up care, the primary care provider must be
able to access the records of these results. However, to access the in-
formation from the urgent care center or emergency department, the
patient’s consent is required by HIPAA (whether access is obtained
for paper records or electronic access).
To further complicate the picture, state-level patient privacy laws
and associated consent requirements vary. In the context of HIE,
27. Genevieve Morris, Trusted Exchange Framework and Common Agreement: A Common
Sense Approach to Achieving Health Information Interoperability, HEALTH IT BUZZ BLOG (Jan.
5, 2018), https://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/interoperability/trusted-exchange-framework-com-
mon-agreement-common-sense-approach-achieving-health-information-interoperability (dis-
cussing HIO business practices that motivated the drafting of the Trusted Exchange Framework
and Common Agreement (TEFCA)).
28. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/
understanding/summary/index.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
29. OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND
SECURITY OF HEALTH INFORMATION 29, 32 (Apr. 2015), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/privacy/privacy-and-security-guide.pdf.
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there are two primary models of patient consent: opt-out and opt-in.
The opt-out model assumes inclusion of all patients and their associ-
ated health information in the HIO unless patients opt-out from al-
lowing the HIO to share their information across provider
organizations in support of their care. Opt-in requires advance con-
sent from patients to allow their information to be shared. In practice,
there are many differences in how each model has been implemented.
For example, one hybrid approach to patient consent is to treat pa-
tient information for physical health as opt-out while behavioral
health information requires a patient to opt-in to allow this informa-
tion to be shared with other providers. Behavioral health data has ad-
ditional protections beyond HIPAA and state laws may be more
restrictive than HIPAA.30 Another protection for behavioral health
data includes 42 C.F.R. § 2, which requires federally-funded substance
abuse treatment centers to obtain patient consent to disclose patient
identifiable information.31 This hybrid consent model requires an HIE
infrastructure that is capable of managing a sophisticated set of rules
that addresses all possible combinations of data type (e.g., mental
health, substance abuse, or physical health) and level of consent (e.g.,
yes to any provider, yes to specific providers, yes only in emergency
care scenarios) that is not routinely available within HIOs. Many
HIOs are limited by their technology to an all-or-nothing strategy in
which all information on a patient is available or none is available. As
a result, the majority of HIOs work with participating provider organi-
zations to filter out behavioral health data from what is shared. A pro-
vider accessing patient information via the HIO would not know
whether an absence of this information means the patient does not
have any behavioral health conditions or whether the patient has
these conditions but these conditions (as well as any associated medi-
cations, clinical notes, care plans, etc.) are not shared. This can lead to
patient safety challenges when a patient’s behavioral health informa-
tion influences the safest and most effective course of treatment for
physical health concerns.
VIII. POLICY SOLUTIONS TO REDUCE ERRORS RELATED TO
PATIENT PRIVACY PROTECTION
Current mechanisms are limited for achieving the dual goals of pro-
tecting patient privacy and pursuing safe and effective HIE. In partic-
30. Behavioral Health Data Exchange Consortium ONC State Health Policy Consortium Pro-
ject Final Report, RTI INT’L (June 2014), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/bhdeconsor
tiumfinalreport_06182014_508_compliant.pdf [hereinafter RTI INT’L].
31. 42 C.F.R. § 2.13 (2017).
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ular, there is a need to update regulations to accommodate new
technologies while continuing to protect patient privacy. A key first
step is harmonizing patient consent requirements under federal and
state law. Some states have taken steps individually to modulate their
privacy laws’ stringency in order to facilitate HIE. For example, Ha-
waii, Kansas, Wisconsin, and Utah have passed legislation to allow
HIE in accordance with HIPAA, eliminating more restrictive state re-
quirements.32 However, widespread harmonization remains elusive
and a recent review of state laws relating to HIE concluded that much
work remains to be done. As of 2016, among thirty-one states with
laws addressing privacy and HIE, sixteen followed the opt-out ap-
proach, eight described an opt-in process, and the rest adopted other
approaches to HIE participation. Twenty-three imposed specific confi-
dentiality requirements on HIE users and five mentioned confidenti-
ality without providing specific requirements.33
As an alternative to legal harmonization, mandated technical solu-
tions could be pursued. With respect to particular types of sensitive
data, there are ways to explore how technology can facilitate an ap-
proach to electronic exchange of sensitive data that also protects pa-
tient privacy. The ONC funded a Behavioral Health Data Exchange
Consortium to identify and address challenges to exchanging behav-
ioral health information.34 The consortium made a number of recom-
mendations. It determined that, to comply with more stringent
consent requirements for sharing mental health and substance abuse
information, the most expeditious route to enabling behavioral health
HIE is to center these efforts on directed communications between
providers.35 While this strategy constrains the HIE approach to one-
to-one communications between providers and does not enable query-
based access to a community-wide health record, it does represent a
means for sharing patient-specific behavioral health care information.
In addition, from 2013 through 2015 the ONC supported the devel-
opment of a technical standard called Data Segmentation for Privacy
32. Kate Johnson et al., Getting the Right Information to the Right Health Care Providers at the
Right Time: A Road Map for States to Improve Health Information Flow Between Providers,
NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N 25 (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.nga.org/center/publications/getting-the-
right-information-to-the-right-health-care-providers-at-the-right-time-a-road-map-for-states-to-
improve-health-information-flow-between-providers/.
33. Cason D. Schmit et al., Falling Short: How State Laws Can Address Health Information
Exchange Barriers and Enablers, 25 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 635, 638 (2018).
34. RTI INT’L, supra note 30.
35. Id.
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(DS4P).36 DS4P is a standard for adding a metadata tag to an elec-
tronic document to flag it as needing patient consent before being dis-
closed.37 Historically, it has been difficult or impossible for providers
to separate out parts of a patient’s record that are subject to special
consent requirements from parts that are not. The DS4P tag can help
address this problem. However, this may not be a comprehensive so-
lution and it is unclear whether DS4P is ready to be implemented at
scale. Further, as long as DS4P remains an optional feature of certi-
fied EHR technology, providers will have to request—and pay extra
for—the capability that DS4P offers. Even if they are willing to incur
the cost, the practical value of DS4P could still be limited if provider
organizations implement DS4P in non-standardized ways (i.e., by us-
ing an inconsistent set of rules for when and how to apply the tags).
CONCLUSION
Electronic Health Information Exchange is essential to ensure that,
at both individual and population levels, providers and administrators
have the information they need to make safe, effective, and efficient
care decisions. As efforts at various levels of scale are pursued to en-
sure that HIE becomes ubiquitous, there are also important patient
safety challenges that require attention. Specific provider organization
practices, technology solutions, and policy efforts are needed to miti-
gate these specific patient safety risks from HIE.
36. Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., 2015 Edition Final Rule: Data Seg-
mentation for Privacy (DS4P), HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/2015
editionehrcertificationcriteriads4p10615.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
37. Id.
